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CONTROLLING THE CONTROLLERS
IN PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS
James C. Bruno*
I. Introduction
This article will examine the rights and responsibilities of a
party in control of a corporation.' The discussion of these rights
and responsibilities focuses principally on the law of Michigan.
However, passages on policy, discussion of the development of
relevant Michigan law, and recommendations for changes in the
law are pertinent to the general problem-area of parent-subsidiary
relations encountered in all jurisdictions.
The terms "parent" and "subsidiary" are used in this article
because of their familiarity, although terms such as "dominating
shareholder" and "controlling entity" are often substituted for
"parent." The term "relation," as used in this article, includes any
contract, gentlemen's agreement, directive, exercise of influence,
or any other interaction between a corporation and another party.
This article will investigate the law regulating direct par-
ent-subsidiary relations which involve injury to the subsidiary.
Topics such as the purchase of shares from shareholders, many
forms of oppression of minority shareholders (e.g., refusal to
declare dividends), sale of control, and competition with the cor-
poration are not, however, within the scope of this article. In such
cases, the primary injury is not to the corporation, and its parent
is not involved. 2
* Member of the Michigan Bar.
'A control party can be a partnership, corporation, individual or any other legal entity.
Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (1915)
(control by corporation), Brown Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772
(1927) (control by individual), Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218
(1892) (control by a group of persons).2A recent New York Court of Appeals decision has held that the corporation may recover
insider trading profits although the individual shareholders and not the corporation
were the injured parties. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 37 L.W. 2691 (1969).
Prospectus
II. Sources of Michigan Law Governing
the Parent-Subsidiary Relation
The common-law was the original regulator of the par-
ent-subsidiary relationship both in Michigan and elsewhere.3 In
the last half of the nineteenth century, the Michigan Supreme
Court extensively considered the problem of corporate officers,
directors, and agents dealing with their corporation or acting
simultaneously for different corporations. The court's early deci-
sions were not in agreement as to which branch of the common
law governed the relations. These early decisions applied the law
of agency, trusts and contracts in the court's search for the
appropriate body of law. The fiduciary cases of the 1800's, which
centered on an agent's duty to his employer, generally did not
involve corporations and their control parties. These cases, how-
ever, gave rise to many doctrines which are part of the present
common-law governing dealings between parents and their subsi-
diaries. These doctrines are examined in parts III, IV and V.
By the early 190's, the Michigan courts had settled upon the
law of trusts to restrict parent corporations and other control
parties. 4 While the courts utilized trust law principles in deciding
parent-subsidiary cases, they did not attempt to apply the entire
law of trusts to such relationships.
The language in the decisions, however, fails to make this
limited application explicit. This failure leaves much leeway for
the imposition of duties upon control parties that may retard
commercial and economic growth. 5 A control party is not a
3 1n general see Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations (1936).
4Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (1915).5 An excessive amount of contingent liability may dissuade talented businessmen from
accepting corporate positions. See Loomis, A Squeeze on Directors, FORTUNE, May
15, 1969, at 146. An example of a trust doctrine which, if adopted to regulate
fiduciary relations, would impose excessive contingent liability is in Mosser v. Dar-
row, 341 U.S. 267, 95 L. Ed. 927, 71 S. Ct. 680 (1951). The Court held the trustee in
bankruptcy liable for the concealed profits of his employees although the trustee
personally had no gain from the transaction. One commentator on the Mosser case
wrote:
Moreover, since Supreme Court decisions in bankruptcy
are liberally cited in cases involving common trustees
and equity receivers, there is little doubt that the deci-
sion will apply to them as well. 52 COLUM. L. REV.
514,521 (1952).
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"trustee" in the fullest sense of the word. For example, a new
"trustee" will not be appointed by the court if the party surren-
ders his control, a control party does not have legal title to the
corporation's property, and a "trustee" is not subject to judicial
supervision of his management of the corporation.
A less confusing approach would be to consistently character-
ize a control party as a "fiduciary" or "corporate fiduciary."
Under such an approach, the parent would be governed by the
general duties of a fiduciary or perhaps by special rules of the
common law of corporate fiduciaries to be developed by the
judiciary or the legislature. Indeed, the term "fiduciary" may
itself be overly broad. The workings of intercorporate relations
continue to evolve, and the law regulating them need not be
inflexibly bound by the old duties of a trustee or of a fiduciary.
Reforms stated in the language of existing principles may, how-
ever, present a greater likelihood of acceptance.
The Michigan Legislature has intervened to regulate particular
aspects of the parent-subsidiary relationship, although no section
of the Michigan General Corporation Act(M.G.C.A.)6 establishes
Also, economic growth may depend upon the ability of business to adopt new
procedures to meet the exigencies of the future. The restrictions imposed by a trustee
status reduces business flexibility. If business organization was still constricted by the
old doctrine invalidating double agents, the use of common directors, which allows
the spreading of scarce high-talent personnel, would be impossible. The Michigan
Supreme Court, in a recent case, has tacitly recognized the inappropriateness of the
term trustee as a description for control parties. In a lengthy decision, it avoided use
of the term and used fiduciary in its place. Fenestra v. Gulf American Land Corp.,
377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966).
6MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 450.1-.193 (1967). Compare PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 408 (1967),
officers and directors stand in a "fiduciary relation to the corporation." In at least one
case the Michigan Supreme Court has impliedly held that the common law duty of a
fiduciary has been enacted into § 450.47 of MicH. COMp. LAWS (1967) which reads in
part:
The directors of every corporation, and each of them, in
the management of the business, affairs, and property of
the corporation, and in the selection, supervision and
control of its committees and of the officers and agents of
the corporation, shall give the attention and exercise the
vigilance, diligence, care and skill, that prudent men use
in like or similar circumstances.
See Detroit Gray Iron & Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Martin, 362 Mich. 205, 211, 106
N.W. 2d 794, 797 (1961).
May 1970]
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a general rule to govern a parent's dealings with its subsidiary.
One unanswered question of Michigan corporate common law
continues to be whether the M.G.C.A. statutory provisions sup-
plement or supplant the common law. The question is examined
infra.
Parent-subsidiary relations in Michigan are also affected by
statutes other than the M.G.C.A. These statutes include state and
federal antitrust and securities laws; 7 they are sufficiently
different in rationale and sufficiently complex to merit in-
dependent consideration.
III. The Concept of Control and its Relation
to the Duty of a Parent.
A. The Requirement that Control Exist.
Under Michigan law, a director, as well as a party which
dominates such a director, 8 owes the duty of a fiduciary to the
corporation, shareholders, and creditors. 9 This fiduciary duty
exists whether or not control of the corporation is present.10
Although the Michigan decisions do not directly so hold, implicit
in at least their early reasoning is the rule that the existence of
corporate control raises the fiduciary duty of directors and others
to a higher duty such as the duty of a trustee."' This distinction
between a non-controlling fiduciary and a controlling trustee im-
plies that the duties owed by each to the corporation are different.
In fact, these duties are not different and thus, the doctrine of
control gives rise to a distinction without a difference. 12
7 See Kaplan, Shareholder Attacks on Mergers and Acquisitions Under Federal Securities
Laws, 50 CHI. B. REC. 441, 445 (1969). See also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 ( 2nd Cir. 1968), where the court allowed a lOb-5 action against dominating
shareholders who purchased shares at an allegedly inadequate price.
8Wagner Electric Corp. v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934);
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
9See Wagner Electric Corp. v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934).
1'The Michigan decisions have settled the principle that the duty of a fiduciary is not
imposed upon a majority stockholder until control exists. Fenestra v. Gulf Land
Development Co., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966).
"See note 6, supra.
'
2Accord, CALLAGHAN'S MICH. CIv. JUR. Corporations § 79 (Directors as fiduciaries) and
§ 166 (Control by majority; rights of minority). According to the strict language of the
336 [Vol 3:2
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The law regulating a fiduciary's duty to the corporation is
capable of protecting a corporation, stockholders, creditors, and
other interested parties such as employees and suppliers. In addi-
tion, its applicability is not contingent upon the existence of
control. It is the author's view that no worthwhile reason exists
for continuing the doctrine of control and for the consequent
application of the law of trusts to regulate the parent-subsidiary
control relationships. The duty of a director not part of a control
group should be the same as the duty of those directors in control
of the corporation.' 3 Accordingly, the status of control party
should not give rise to any special categorization such as that of a
trustee. All fiduciaries should bear the same obligations and
duties, whether or not they are in a control position.
The author's argument aside, Michigan decisions appear to
attribute some importance to the existence of control. The court
will diligently make a determination as to the existence of control;
yet the rules it applies to a party in control are indistinguishable
from the rules it applies to a non-controlling fiduciary. The author
has found no Michigan decision which holds a control-entity
trustee to a stricter standard then a non-control entity fiduciary. 14
Thus, there is no practical reason for continuing the doctrine of
control.
Michigan decisions, the possession of control makes the controller a fiduciary, Fe-
nestra v. Gulf America Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966), or
trustee, Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892), vis-a-vis the
minority shareholders. The obligations of such a trustee or fiduciary are enforced by
the corporation directly or through a derivative action with any recovery inuring to
the benefit of the corporation. Where the acts of a non-controlling director are
challenged, the courts hold that the director is a fiduciary of the corporation itself. A
violation of this duty may also be enforced by the corporation directly or through a
derivative action with any damages recovered paid to the corporation. Kimball v.
Bangs, 321 Mich. 394, 32 N.W.2d 831 (1948). Michigan law provides for the
recovery by shareholders who are damaged beyond the amount of loss to the com-
pany by the acts of a control party. Wagner Electric Corp. v. Hydraulic Brake Co.,
269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 844 (1934). There would be no need to limit this liability to
shareholders and others to instances when the offending fiduciary was also a control
party, cf. Micti. COMp. LAWS. § 450.47 (1967).
'
3 For example, rules governing the sale of control by a majority of the board of directors
should also apply to a minority of the board.
141t would appear that the Michigan Legislature is in agreement with the author and not
with the judiciary, as the sections of the M.G.C.A. dealing with parent-subsidiary
corporation contracts do not give weight to the existence or non-existence of control.
e.g. §§ 13(5), MICH. COMP. LAWS 450.46 (1967).
May 19701
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B. Concept of Control
A justification for eliminating the concept of control from the
law governing parents and subsidiaries lies in the inherent
difficulty in determining its existence and its possessor.
1. Existence of Control
One problem is establishing the proper time period to examine
in determining whether control exists. Its existence may be a
matter of days or hours and may encompass only one board
meeting. Thus, it will be quite difficult to pinpoint exactly when
control does exist. In the author's opinion, the relevant time
period for determining whether control exists is the day or days
during which the challenged relation existed. 15
The problems of determining the nature of the relation and its
time period will exist even if the court does not use the doctrine
of control since the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a
necessary prerequisite to conclusion of liability. However, this
determination of fiduciary status is more easily made than ascer-
taining the existence of control. Where the alleged control party is
not a single person or entity who openly controls the corporation,
the proof of the existence of control will often depend upon
unknown agreements and parallel voting patterns among the di-
rectors. 16
2. Possession of Control
A person or group need not own or control over fifty percent of
'
5 See Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary Relations,
74 YALE L.J. 338, 350 (1964).
16An interesting problem is presented when deciding whether a majority vote by the board
of directors is simply an ad hoc majority rather than a control group. The practical
resolution of this question requires delving into events prior to the action of the board
to which objection has been made. Historical voting patterns, proof of collusive
agreements, contemporaneous statements and other evidence that the majority was
acting as a group may be introduced. This conjuring of the control devil, where no
definite agreement by the group exists, is too great a threat to the doctrine of majority
rule to be worthwhile as it may subject the majority to "trustee" liability on every
vote. Merely saying, however, that proof of a definite agreement to act as the group
should be required before burdening the majority with the duties of a trustee leaves
much to be said. For example, the Michigan court has not had to decide what the
appropriate standard of proof should be.
[Vol. 3:2
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a corporation's voting stock to be in control. 17 The amount of
stock ownership is generally irrelevant to the question of whether
control exists. The Michigan rule appears to be that control exists
when a group of directors or shareholders, by their own agree-
ment or under the direction of another, act together to manage the
corporation and possess sufficient power to do so. 18
The ownership of fifty-one percent of the stock or voting rights
does not make the owner a control party under Michigan law.' 9
The potential for control exists, but this potential is not sufficient
to impose control status. If such a person voted for directors
independent of his control, did not attempt to influence their
votes, and did not make their re-election to the board dependent
upon following his instruction, he would not be a control person
under Michigan law. In fact, a person with a recently acquired
majority ownership who intends to manage the corporation, but
who has not yet been elected to, nor had his agents placed on, the
board of directors, is not yet a control party. 20 Furthermore, it
appears that if no prior voting trust or similar agreement had been
concluded, and no one stockholder controlled a majority of the
directors, no controlling-controlled relationship existed, but only
a majority-minority result in the voting. 21
The present legal importance of the existence of control and
the difficulty of defining control is unfortunate. Protection of the
corporation, as well as those with an interest in it, can be ade-
quately achieved by relying upon the fiduciary duty owed by all
directors. This distinction between those in control and those out
1 7Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Co., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966);
Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (1915).
'
8 Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
19cf. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf America Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966).20The question is raised whether a president who operates the company with a free hand is
transformed into a control person, or whether the Mich. Comp. Laws prevents this by
giving the right, power and duty of management to the board. A second question
raised is whether a board chairman who dominates the board because of his presence,
reputation, ability, and power of persuasion is a control person. These questions
remain unanswered in Michigan and add to the confusion surrounding the doctrine of
control.
2lTo impose a trustee status on a director, merely because he voted with the majority
would be to impose a penalty without a reason for it. Of course the author maintains
that the present Michigan law on corporate trustees is no different than the Michigan
law on corporate fiduciaries.
-May 19701
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of control merely complicates the process by which courts seek to
protect the corporation and interested parties.
IV. The General Right of a Parent to Control the
Operation of a Subsidiary Corporation
The general right in Michigan of one corporation to direct the
affairs of another corporation depends upon the method used
to acquire control. Formation of a control group by simple con-
tract is restricted. In Scripps v. Sweeney, 22 the Michigan Supreme
Court held void a contract between four of the nine direc-
tor-shareholders of four newspapers. Each paper was a separate
company, but the same shareholders held varying percentages of
stock in each newspaper. The four contracting shareholders to-
gether held a majority of the shares in the four papers. They
agreed that each newspaper would work in concert with the
others, that the interests of the combination would be superior to
the interests of each individual paper, and that each paper would
be entitled to the journalistic and business secrets of the others.
At the same time, the newspapers were to remain independent in
journalistic and business policy. The court held that the agree-
ment violated public policy as it bound them to carry out the
agreement ". . . whether or not for the best interests of the corpo-
rations, respectively, .... ,23 The court did state that the agree-
ment would have been valid if all of the shareholders had agreed
to it.24
22160 Mich. 148, 125 N.W. 72 (1910).
23 1d. at 164, 125 N.W. at 76. The decision could be read to prevent only those manage-
ment contracts in which there is personal aggrandizement.24 1d. at 164, 125 N.W. 79. The Michigan court has also ruled void as against public policy
a loan contract vesting in the lender ". . . complete charge of finances" for the
duration of the loan. Marvin v. Solventol Chemical Products, 298 Mich. 296, 298
N.W. 782 (1941). The contract was unenforceable despite the fact that it bore the
signature of the corporation rather than of the directors. The directors could not
avoid their duty to manage by having the corporation agree to such abdication. This
holding raises questions as to the validity in Michigan of clauses in bonds and
preferred stock turning over control of the board to the creditors in case of default.
See Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947) (dicta upholding such clauses); Ecclestone v. Indialantic,
Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 255, 29 N.W.2d 679, 681 (1947) (upholds stockholder-creditor
keeping voting rights when selling shares). Most U.S. jurisdictions, including Mich-
[Vol. 3:2
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Although control may not be acquired by simple contract with
the corporation or its directors, valid methods are available. Un-
der Michigan law, all of the shareholders may join together to
vest control of the corporation in a group of persons.2 5 This
control arrangement may be accomplished by an agreement to
vote in a particular manner for the board of directors. All of the
shareholders may also agree to vote in a particular manner on
proposals presented to them.2 6
The acquisition of control by agreement of less than all of the
shareholders is restricted. In 1932, the Michigan Supreme Court
approved the doctrine that a stockholder could not separate the
voting power from his shares by means of an agreement to vote in
a particular manner, or through appointment of a proxy, if such
separation was done for a personal profit.2 7 The court failed to
provide any definition or examples of what constitutes a profit
except to rule that a cash payment was profit. However, any
minority or majority could reach an accord on a particular course
of action if none received a personal gain except for the promise
of others to vote in a certain manner. Thus, the independence of a
shareholder's vote could be compromised only where no personal
profit was involved.
Without acknowledging the "personal profit" doctrine or the
case which gave rise to it, Michigan was presented in 1947 with a
new rule in Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc.2z The court held that
split of the legal ownership from the exercise of the voting rights
would be enforced if there was some benefit to the corporation or
some corporate purpose was served, although the person who
separated the ownership rights may also have received some
"personal interest." The case containing this pronouncement was
unusual in that the stock and legal ownership were transferred,
igan, do not allow contracts which remove the powers of management from the board.
However, exceptions do exist. Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
25Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich. 148, 125 N.W. 72 (1910); Wilbur v. Stoeppel, 82 Mich.
344, 48 N.W. 724 (1890).26See Wilbur v. Stoeppel, 82 Mich. 344, 48 N.W. 724 (1890).27Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich. 547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932). See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
799 (1956); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 376 (1964).
28319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W.2d 679 (1947).
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but the voting rights were retained. 29 The usual transaction is a
retention of stock ownership with a splitting off of the voting
rights. The seller retaining his voting rights was a creditor, direc-
tor and corporate attorney, and he was to continue his services
after the sale.
The author does not object to the results or to the substantive
rules of law as stated in the Ecclestone decision. The unfortunate
aspect of the decision is the failure of the court to distinguish or
even consider contemporary Michigan precedent prohibiting a
separation of voting rights for a personal profit, which was applic-
able and perhaps conflicting.30 The rule would appear to be that a
separation of stock ownership from the exercise of voting rights is
proper in Michigan if a corporate purpose exists even though a
personal "interest" is served, whereas such a separation is im-
proper if a personal "profit" is made.31 The legality of such
transactions in which a corporate purpose is served and a person-
al "profit" is made is unclear. It is possible that the distinction
between "profit" and "interest" is one of flagrancy.
To acquire control and yet to avoid the problem of the illegality
of simple contracts for control, and to avoid the uncertainty of the
legality of shareholder voting agreements 32 in which persoral gain
results, recourse may be had to a statutory voting trust; to the
purchase of voting shares; or to the use of proxies without paying
a consideration.33
29This fact was not discussed by the court. The case was treated as though the present
owner had given a proxy to his transferor. This is something he could not have done
as he never possessed the right to vote the shares under the terms of the transfer.
"°The possible conflict was with Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich. 547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932) which
held a separation of stock ownership from the exercise of voting rights invalid if a
personal profit was realized.31 llegal purpose, fraud, violation of antitrust law, and breach of fiduciary duty are among
the other available challenges to a shareholder's agreement.32 Herman v. Dereszewski, 312 Mich. 224, 20 N.W.2d 176 (1945). See Ringling Broth-
ers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441
(1947) (allowing voting agreement not complying with voting trust statute).3 3The suggestion to purchase more shares in order to acquire control may seem su-
perfluous. Yet, as late as 1918, a Michigan court lamented that subsequent to a
take-over of Osceola by Calumet and Hecla, "the Osceola has now no life, plans, no
management, no policy, no officers excecutive in nature, and no future except as
willed by the Calumet and Hecla." Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187
Mich. 238, 242, 153 N.W. 718, 719 (1915). Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf America Land
Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 608, 141 N.W.2d 36, 55 (1966). MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450-40
(1967).
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A corporation legally in control of another has the right, under
Michigan law, to manage the latter without interference from the
minority. This authority is limited by the parent corporation's
common law duty as a trustee or fiduciary34 and by certain statu-
tory provisions. These restrictions are discussed below.
V. Restrictions on a Parent's General Right to
Manage and Direct a Subsidiary.
The pervasive restriction imposed upon a controlling party is
that the controlling person, including a parent corporation, must
manage the subsidiary for the benefit of all, including the sub-
sidiary corporation, its shareholders, and its creditors. This duty
arises from the control person's status as a trustee or fiduciary.
Persons occupying this relation towards
each other are under an obligation to make
the property or fund productive of the most
that can be obtained from it for all who are
interested in it; and those who seek to make a
profit out of it, at the expense of those whose
rights in it are the same as their own, are
unfaithful to the relation they have assumed
and are guilty, at least, of constructive
fraud.3 5
The problem is to translate this generalized statement of obliga-
tion into rules covering specific relations between the parent and
its subsidiary.3 6 Subsidiaries are not illegal, and the law should
not subject a parent to potential liability on every relation with its
subsidiary based upon a subjective standard such as the one
quoted above.
The common law in Michigan has developed around the re-
quirements that parent-subsidiary relations are void or voidable
unless:
34 0ne Michigan decision has held the only duty of the majority is not to commit fraud.
Crowe v. Consolidated Limber Co., 239 Mich. 300, 214 N.W. 126 (1927). This does
not give sufficient protection to the corporation and to those with interests in it as
fraud requires a misrepresentation and not merely a violation of duty. This is not
good law today.
35Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 115, 53 N.W. 218,224 (1892).3 6As recognized by Bliss Petroleum Co., v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 54 (1931).
May 19701
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A) the terms of the relation are fair to the
subsidiary; and
B) the relation is completely disclosed; and
C) the relation is ratified.
The legislature has incorporated one or more of those doctrines in
its statutory regulation of certain common intercorporate rela-
tions.3 7
A. The Doctrine of Fairness
1. Establishment of the Doctrine
Early Michigan cases hold that contracts made by an interested
fiduciary were void, not merely voidable.3 8 Good faith or honesty
would not save the contract under these early decisions: "The
fairness or unfairness of the transaction is not open to proof or
discussion."3 9
The first Michigan decision involving a claim of injury caused
by a control group's manipulation of the corporation was Miner v.
Belle Isle Ice Co.40 One alleged fraudulent act was the rental of
property owned by the dominant member of the control group to
the corporation at an inflated price. After citing the Michigan rule
that such contracts were void, the Supreme Court added,
In any case the burden is upon the director to
show fairness, reasonableness, and good
faith, and upon this record these transactions
must not only be held to be constructively
fraudulent, but fraudulent in fact. 41
The court was stating that even if they would adopt the rule that
37The statutory uses of the three doctrines are described in their respective subsections,
infra.3 8Clute v. Barron, 2 Mich. 192 (1851); Dwight & Pierce v. Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330 (1852);
People v. Overyssel, I I Mich. 222 (1863); Flint & Pere Marquette Ry. v. Dewey, 14
Mich. 477 (1866); Adams Mining Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich. 73 (1872).39Dwight & Pierce v. Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330,335 (1852). This rule was identical to the
English rule and it had been adopted by many other American jurisdictions. Bowman,
The Validity of Contracts Between Corporations Having Common Directors, 4
MIcH. L. REV. 577 (1904).
4093 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892). See also Wilbur v. Stoeppel, 82 Mich. 344, 46 N.W.
724 (1890).41Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 111-12, 53 N.W. 218, 222-23 (1892).
[Vol. 3:2
Parent-Subsidiary Relations
such contracts are voidable subject to proof of their fairness,
reasonableness, and good faith, these three standards were not
met by the defendant control party.
The Michigan Supreme Court discarded its rule which voided
transactions by an interested fiduciary in Aldine Mfg. Co. v.
Phillips.4 2 The court stated the rule that "When the transactions
are open, honest, and fair and known to the officials of both
companies, they will be sustained." 43 The court held in Aldine
that the question of fairness is to be one of fact. A charge that the
corporation paid more than it would have paid if purchasing from
a firm in which the fiduciary was not interested was successfully
met by proving both the superior quality of the items actually
purchased and the making of only a "reasonable" profit on them.
Thus the doctrine of fairness became part of Michigan common
law.
Today the doctrine of fairness pervades the law governing
parent-subsidiary relations in Michigan and other U.S. jurisdic-
tions, 44 except perhaps in the sale or lease of substantially all of
the subsidiary's assets, or in a merger or a consolidation where
actual fraud by the parent must be proven. 45
2. Burden of Proving Fairness.
The challenged fiduciary bears the burden of proving fairness!46
One Michigan decision holds that the burden of proving fairness
may be more easily satisfied if the transaction is at arm's length.4 7
The court's homilies on arm's length transactions are unrealistic
when applied to situations involving parents or any powerful
fiduciary. The discussions of arm's length transactions ignore the
inequality of bargaining positions in such relations, and the stan-
42129 Mich. 240, 88 N.W. 632, 633 (1902).
43id. at 243. An earlier Michigan decision indicated that the court's position was moving
away from the English rule. German-America Seminary v. Herman-Kiefer, 43 Mich.
105, 4 N.W. 636 (1880).44 Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 74
YALE L. J. 338 (1964).
45See Porter v. Porter Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953)46 Patrons' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929).4 7Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961).
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dard itself is impossible to apply in those instances where two
completely independent parties would not or could not be in-
volved, such as the allocation of tax savings in filing a joint return.
The arm length's criteria should not be a requirement for validity,
nor should it have effect on the burden of proof, although between
the two, it has greater appeal as the latter. To attempt to prove
that a parent-subsidiary transaction was at arm's length would be
to attempt to prove a falsehood.
During the early 1900's, contracts between a corporation and
its non-control fiduciaries continued to be upheld if "fair, open,
and known to the directors and stockholders." 48 In fact, the
requirement of fairness was the only standard mentioned in one
case. 49 However, when the interested party was a parent corpo-
ration or other control entity, some doubt remained as to the
legality of a transaction with the subsidiary due to the decision in
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice.50 Corporations were finally given the right
to contract with their subsidiaries in Stowe v. Hartford Fair
Grounds Ass'n5 l . Mr. Justice Butzel's opinion contains no
citations, yet this unanimous decision impliedly overruled Belle
Isle Ice. Co. It is this type of incomplete opinion which has
caused the uncertainty in Michigan's law governing par-
ent-subsidiary relations.
Stowe properly allowed a parent to deal with its subsidiary, but
the parent's duty of fairness to a subsidiary was paramount. This
duty was enforceable by the coiporation, the shareholders, and
the creditors of the corporation.
Since 1931, a fiduciary has had statutory authority to contract
with his corporation. The burden of proving fairness is expressly
48 Barnes v. Spencer& Barnes Co., 162 Mich. 509, 127 N.W. 752 (1910); Quinn v. Quinn
Mfg. Co., 201 Mich. 664, 167 N.W. 898 (1918); Reynick v. Allinton & Curtiss Mfg.
Co., 179 Mich. 630, 146 N.W. 252 (1914); Henry v. Michigan Sanitarium, Ass'n.,
147 Mich. 142, 110 N.W. 523 (1907).
49Brown Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772 (1927). Two other cases
mentioned only the duty to act in "good faith" which is too indefinite to be used as
the one general requirement. Thompson v. Walker, 253 Mich. 126, 234 N.W. 144
(1931); Bliss Petroleum Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 53 (1931). Note
the similar difficulty in determining whether a holder of commercial paper took it in
good faith to satisfy the requirements of a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-302.
5093 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
51249 Mich. 107, 227 N.W. 702 (1929).
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placed upon the party asserting the validity of the contract. This
is set forth in M.G.C.A. section 13(5):
No contract of any corporation made with
any director of such corporation or with a
partnership of other group or association of
which any such director shall be a member or
with any other corporation of which such di-
rector may be a member or director and no
contract between corporations having com-
mon director shall be invalid because of such
respective facts alone. When the validity of
any such contract is questioned, the burden
of proving the fairness to the contracting par-
ties of any such contract shall be upon the
director, partnership, other group or associ-
ation, or corporation who shall be asserting
the validity of such contract. 52 [Emphasis
added].
Prior to the enactment of section 13(5), there was only the vague
statutory duty to operate the corporation in "good faith."15 3
The scope of section 13(5) is limited to contracts between a
director and his corporation and contracts between corporations
with interlocking directors. A parent company's contracts with its
subsidiary are clearly included. However, in addition to not ap-
plying to all fiduciaries, the statute applies only to "contracts,"
and the scope of this term is not clear. It does include a chattel
mortgage, 54 but it does not include some other aspects and agree-
ments of a parent- subsidiary relationship. For example, a sub-
sidiary might allow a parent corporation to examine its customer
lists without charge if the parent were seeking customers for a
complementary product. It is doubtful whether section 13(5) ap-
plies to that situation; it would be covered by the general
rules of the common law, however. 55
5 2MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.13(5) (1967).53 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 10020 (1929).54Wiseman v. United Dairies, 324 Mich. 473, 493, 37 N.W.2d 174, 182 (1949). But
presumably not an employment contract. Garwin v. Anderson, 334 Mich. 287, 54
N.w.2d 667 (1952) (§ 13(5) was ignored.) Michigan common law allowed provisions
in article of incorporation permitting a fiduciary to deal with his corporation. Voight
v. Remick, 260 Mich. 198, 210, 244, N.W. 446, 450 (1932).
55cf. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36
(1966), Contra Thomas v. Satfield, Co., 363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961)
(incorrectly holding § 13(5) "imposed" a standard of fairness).
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Section 13(5) requires that a party seeking to uphold the con-
tract's validity bear the burden of proving requisite fairness. It is
uncertain whether the legislature intended to make fairness the
only requirement for a contract's validity. In the author's opinion,
this was not the legislature's intention. Section 13(5) only states
who should bear the burden of proof if the requirement of fairness
is imposed by law other than that found in section 13(5).56 Thus,
section 13(5) merely codified two aspects of the existing law: that
such contracts are not void, and that any prerequisite of fairness
which might be required by law outside of the section would have
to be proven by the party asserting fairness.
While M.G.C.A. section 13(5) covers contracts in general,
M.G.C.A. section 46 regulates loan contracts. 57 Section 46 for-
bids loans to officers, directors, and stockholders by non-financial
institutions unless the loans are approved by a two-thirds majority
of directors excluding any director obtaining such loan. The stat-
ute contains no requirement of fairness; yet a recent Michigan
Supreme Court decision wrote of subjecting a section 46 loan
from a subsidiary to a parent to the general standard of fairness
under the common law and under section 13(5).58 This require-
ment is further evidence that the common law has not been
supplanted but merely supplemented by statute. Curiously
enough, loans from parent to subsidiary are not covered by the
terms of section 46. Rather, they are treated as any other contract
between the two and come within the ambit of section 13(5).
A sale or lease of less than substantially all of a corporation's
assets to a fiduciary is covered by the common law and by
M.G.C.A. section 13(5). Where the sale or lease encompasses
substantially all of a corporation's assets, the sale or lease must
comply with M.G.C.A. section 57. Section 57 removes the deci-
sion-making power as to sale or lease from the hands of the
directors and places it into the hands of the majority of each class
of stock. This removal does not necessarily mean that a parent or
56Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966).57 MIcHi. Comp. LAWS § 450.46 (1967).
"Porter v. Porter Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.w.2d 135 (1953). This was a 4-3
decision with the minority only requiring that a lack of fairness be proved.
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other control party can, by complying with section 57, avoid any
liability where the terms of the sale or lease are unfair to the
controlled corporation. Michigan decisions appear to uphold
M.G.C.A. section 57 transactions unless there is an actual fraud
perpetrated by the majority against the minority shareholders. 59 A
fiduciary, however, should not be excused from the obligation to
enter only into relations with his corporation which are fair to the
latter as the Michigan decisions apparently allow him to do.60 It is
the board of directors which must propose a sale or lease of
substantially all of the corporation's assets under M.G.C.A. sec-
tion 57. No proposal should be sent to the shareholders for
approval unless it is fair or unless its lack of fairness is ex-
plained.61 This point has not been made clear in Michigan deci-
sions.
3. A New Definition of Fairness
To characterize a relation as fair is to impute to it many
attributes.6 2 A fair relation is impartial, just, unbiased, equitable,
59Porter v. Porter Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953).
60See also Voight v. Remick, 260 Mich. 198, 244 N.W. 446 (1932).61 Porter v. Porter Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953). The problem of
a parent's direct duty to minority shareholders, rather than to the corporation, is not
within the scope of this article. However, one observation concerning that duty is in
order. The Michigan legislature has provided, in MICH. COMp LAWS § 450.44 (1967),
that shareholders dissenting from a MICH. COMp. LAWS 450.57 (1967) sale or lease
possess the right to receive the fair cash value of their shares. Section 44 provides the
sole remedy to such minority dessenting shareholders under the MICH. COMP. LAWS,
even though unfairness may be present in the transaction. The Michigan Supreme
Court in Porter has upheld the exclusiveness of § 44's remedy.
Since MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.52-54 (1967) governing mergers and consolidation has
language similar to MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.44,57 (1967), presumably the same
exclusivity of remedy applies. Accordingly, dissenting shareholders will be held to
their statutory appraisal remedy unless they can prove fraud.621t is worthwhile noting that the "fairness" doctrine alone might serve as adequate
protection for minority shareholders. One note written in 1938 stated that the major-
ity rule was that such challenged contracts were valid if fair with the directors having
the burden of proof. Note, Judicial Interference with Intercorporate Transactions, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 348 (1938). Another author wrote in 1948, "And in cases involving
interlocking directories, fairness is always the measure of the validity of the contract,
whether the majority is interested or not." Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate
Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335, n. 10 (1948). See also
Note, The Validity of Contracts Between Corporations with Common Directors 5 I
HARV. L. REV. 327 (1937).
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reasonable and evenhanded.r It is doubtful that there can be a
completely fair relation between a subsidiary corporation and its
control parties and fiduciaries. The latter, in all likehood, would
be favored by the subsidiary over outsiders. More often than not,
some pressure will be exerted on the corporation to deal with the
parent. This pressure will not necessarily be as flagrant as open
reciprocity practices, where the parent or fiduciary only buys
from the corporation as long as the corporation buys from it, but
common sense dictates that pressure will exist. Michigan law has
recognized the need of a corporation to seek help and deal with
its fiduciaries since fiduciaries often have the greatest interest in
the corporation's welfare. 4 At the same time, the law has consid-
ered valid only those relations between a fiduciary and its corpo-
ration which are fair. The word "fair," however, does not have a
commercial meaning and needs clarification. Business fiduciaries
require an interpretation of this concept that can be applied with a
degree of predictability; "good faith" and "arm's length" are
criteria too vague to be relied upon.
The author suggests a definition of fairness based upon com-
mercial realities; that is, a fair parent-subsidiary relation is one
whose terms are within that range of terms which would be
assented to by a reasonable businessman acting solely for the
benefit of a corporation after that businessman has considered all
aspects of the relation.
A temptation exists to use a market test as the definition of
fairness. Under such a test, a fair relation would be one within the
range of terms acceptable to the subsidiary corporation if offered
by a party who was unconnected with, and had no power over,
the corporation. To apply such an open market test when the
situation may be one of a closed market is not realistic. The
market for a subsidiary's goods may be closed to all except the
parent upon the explicit direction of the parent. Proof that a
relation has terms found in the market place is one way to com-
mercially justify it, but it should be the only means.6 5
63BLACK'S LAW DICT. 713 (4th ed., 1957).
6MicH. COMP. LAWS § 450.13(5) (1967).
6There has been substantial activity in state legislatures and courts on the standards for
judging intercorporate transactions. Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts
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B. Disclosure
The first Michigan decision to uphold contracts between a
corporation and an interested fiduciary, Aldine, required that such
agreements be "open ... and known to the officials of both com-
panies."6 6 This disclosure must include all terms of the relation
which are material; that is, all terms which are relevant to a
shareholder's or director's decision to challenge a relation for a
lack of fairness.6 7 The disclosure requirement has, however, had a
varied existence. Courts have ignored the lack of disclosure in
some cases, 68 used it as evidence of a lack of fairness in others, 69
and found it sufficient to give relief in still others. 70 The parties to
whom disclosure should be made remains unclear. Some deci-
sions require disclosure to stockholders and directors whenever a
fiduciary deals with his corporation, 71 while others require only
that the directors be completely informed of the transaction. 72
with Interested Directors, supra note 62. For example, California allows unfair
contracts if approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 820 (West 1962). But cf. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109
Cal. App.2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). At least one court has allowed one-sided
contracts where this was contemplated and accepted by all involved. Everett v.
Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 234, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942). A Michigan decision could be
construed to allow directors to avoid their fiduciary duties in dealing with the corpo-
ration if such was provided for in the articles of incorporation. Voight v. Remick, 260
Mich. 198, 244 N.W. 466 (1932). DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8 § 144 (1953) permits
parent-subsidiary relations without proof of fairness where there is proper ratification.
See also German Stock Corporation Act which contains unique features regulating
parent-subsidiary relations. F. JUENGER & L. SCHMIDT, GERMAN STOCK CORPO-
RATION ACT, Book Ill, (1967).
66129 Mich. 240, 243, 88 N.W. 632, 633 (1902).67Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943).68Stowe v. Hartford Fair Grounds Ass'n., 249 Mich. 107, 227 N.W. 702 (1929); Brown
Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772 (1927); 37 N.W.2d 174 (1949);
Bliss Petroleum Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 53 (1931); Epstein v.
United States, 174 F.2d 754 (1949).69Patron's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1928);
Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961).70 Young Spring & Wire Co. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943); Reitz v.
Owosso Finance, 369 Mich, 408, 120 N.W. 175 (1963); Sant v. Perronville Shingle
Co., 179 Mich. 42, 146 N.W. 212 (1914). One well known Michigan authority has
stated, "The non-disclosure of his adverse interest is not necessarily fraud, actual or
constructive, though it is a circumstance to be considered." R. M. SCHMIDT & Z.
CAVITCH, MICHIGAN CORPORATION LAW WITH FEDERAL TAX ANALYSIS § 2.52(l)
(1969). In view of the three cases just cited, however, any advice to a client not to
disclose is risky.7 1E.g. Patrons' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Holden, 24 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929).7 2E.g. Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176 (1960).
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The requirement of disclosure has not been expressly elimi-
nated by M.G.C.A. section 13(5) as it relates to contracts, or by
section 57 as it relates to the sale or lease of substantially all of
the subsidiary's assets. These sections, however, do not embrace
the requirement either. The common law requirement of dis-
closure should not be read out of Michigan law by a narrow
construction of these two sections. Section 46, on the other hand,
has its own disclosure provision. This section requires that all
shareholders be given an annual report of all loans to share-
holders, officers and directors.
Expanded disclosure requirements would enable the minority
to better protect its interests by providing them with current
information on interested fiduciary relations. However, there are
drawbacks to such a requirement. One such disadvantage is the
cost. Companies already sending out proxies and annual reports
would not be excessively burdened. However, small corporations
that are not already sending out such materials may find the cost
difficult to absorb. A second and more telling objection to ex-
panded disclosure is the natural and justifiable business desire for
internal security. To make public a record of intercorporate trans-
actions would be a significant benefit to a firm's competitors
One writer maintains that the requirement of disclosure in a
parent-subsidiary situation "is both unnecessary and mis-
leading." a73 This is so, he reasons, because disclosure is useless
where the recipients of the disclosed facts are powerless to act, as
would be the case with minority directors. However, this position
is unacceptable. The minority shareholders and directors are not
powerless to act. Shareholder derivative suits are available to
them, and disclosure would enable them to better police the
majority. In addition, requiring disclosure of all transactions to
minority directors might prove to be a psychological block to
flagrant abuses of the subsidiary. It would appear, therefore, that
disclosure to the shareholders should be required.
Indeed, requiring disclosure is a necessity if the law is truly
concerned with overreaching by control parties and other
73Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 74
YALE L.J. 338, 343 (1964).
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fiduciaries. A transaction can hardly be challenged as unfair if the
board and the shareholders are unaware of it. The cost of dis-
closure can be minimized by requiring disclosure only in those
documents already required by law, such as annual reports to the
Secretary of State's office and to the shareholders. It is undoubt-
edly true that disclosure infringes on corporate secrecy, but that
is unavoidable and, in the case of parent-subsidiary relations,
most desirable in promoting fairness.
C. Approval by Ratification
1. Common Law Ratification
A transaction between a parent and its subsidiary7 4 that is
voidable because it is unfair is valid if ratified by all of the
subsidiary shareholders. This ratification is effective only as to
the shareholders and does not bind other parties such as credit-
ors. 75 Moreover, one Michigan case at least implies that a unani-
mous stockholder vote would ratify even a fraudulent or illegal
act perpetrated upon the corporation. 76
However, the effect of a ratification by the subsidiary's direc-
tors of a breach of fiduciary duty, as opposed to an illegal or
fraudulent act, is unclear under Michigan law. If the directors are
the only shareholders, a unanimous ratification vote by the direc-
tors is the same as a unanimous shareholder vote. 77 An unfair
transaction approved in this manner could not be challenged by a
shareholder or director since both groups have unanimously ra-
tified.
It has been said that there can be ratification only where the
corporation could have initially entered into the transaction.78
This rule would seem to preclude ratification of a transaction
which is not fair to the corporation, whether it is with a subsidiary
or not. However, the Michigan rule allowing ratification of unfair
74 Patrons' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929).75 Wiseman v. United Dairies, Inc., 324 Mich. 473, 37 N.W.2d 174 (1949); Algonac
Marine Hardware v. Cline, 10 Mich. App. 158, 159 N.W.2d 150 (1968).76 Crowe v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 239 Mich. 300, 214 N.W. 126 (1927).
77Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, O.&P.A.R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N.W. 905 (1889).7 8 0'Brien v. Dunn Iron Mining Co., 141 Mich. 616, 105 N.W. 133 (1905).
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transactions by unanimous stockholder action is one exception to
this rule.79 This exception should not be broadened to include a
less than unanimous vote by shareholders or a unanimous vote by
directors who are not the sole shareholders. Despite slight Michi-
gan authority to the contrary, 0 shareholders and directors should
not be precluded from challenging a transaction for unfairness
despite approval by their fellow shareholders or directors.81
In addition to those cases holding that ratification may validate
an unfair contract, there are two decisions holding that ratifica-
tion, as well as fairness and disclosure, is a requirement for
validity of a parent-subsidiary transaction.82 In Veeser v. Robin-
son Hotel Co.,a8 the court required ratification on the basis of a
possible, although incorrect, interpretation of an earlier case.84 In
the only case in which this requirement has been urged during the
twenty-five years since Veeser, a federal court stated that it was
".. . doubtful whether Michigan would even recognize the prin-
ciple of the Veeser case today...85
The viability of Veeser was finally reconsidered in Buck v.
Northern Dairy.86 A former president, director, and owner of a
79See text accompaning note 76 supra.
8 Patrons' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929);
Voight v. Remick, 260 Mich. 198, 244 N.W. 446 (1932); Crowe v. Consolidated
Lumber Co., 239 Mich. 300, 214 N.W. 126 (1927).
81Wilbur v. Stoeppel, 82 Mich. 344, 46 N.W. 724 (1890).82Vesser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936); Buck v. Northern
Dairy, 364 Mich. 45, 110 N.W.2d 756 (1961). cf. Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, 0. &
P.A.R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N.W. 905 (1889). The author agrees with R. STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS 683 (1949), that fairness and disclosure provide sufficient protection.
83275 Mich. 133,266 N.W. 54 (1936).
"Veeser misread Patrons' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222
N.W. 754 (1929), as requiring ratification in addition to fairness and disclosure, rather
than as an alternative to fairness. The Patrons' court, in its statement of applicable
law, unfortunately construed two sections of 14A as one. Section 1887, stating the
rules when a contract is invalid for a breach of trust, was combined with language
from § 1888 dealing with how a relation, voidable for a breach of trust, could be
saved by ratification. Poor citation in the official Michigan reporter most likely led the
court in Veeser to read Patrons' as requiring no breach of trust plus ratification if a
fiduciary's relations were to be upheld. The Veeser court would have been on firmer
ground if it had relied upon Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, 0. & P.A.R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41
N.W. 905 (1889), to support its holding making ratification a requirement.
asPergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950), relying on Wiseman v. United
Dairies, Inc., 324 Mich. 473, 37 N.W.2d 174 (1949).
86364 Mich. 45, 110 N.W.2d 756 (1961).
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controlling interest in the defendant corporation had sued for
specific performance of a "retirement annuity agreement." A
circuit court judge granted the relief prayed for, and the defendant
appealed. The lower court's decree was affirmed by an equally
divided court. The Michigan Supreme Court was divided on two
points.
The four justices for reversal voted to overrule Veeser and its
requirement that a quorum of disinterested directors approve the
transaction. The four justices for affirmation implied that Veeser
was still good law, but that its requirements would be satisfied by
approval by a majority of the disinterested directors, whether or
not they constituted a quorum. Such a position poses serious
difficulties for parent-subsidiary relations. As those who favored
overruling Veeser stated:
Indeed, if the principle of the Veeser case
is appled to contracts between corporations
having common directors (e.g., parent and
subsidiary corporations, where, not in-
frequently, a majority of the members of
one Board serve on the Board of the other),
would we not be compelled to say such
contracts are likewise void (not merely voi-
dable) regardless of their fairness to each
corporation? 7
The author agrees that such a decision would be compelled by
the philosophy of Veeser. However, it seems clear that the accep-
tance of Veeser by the four justices was improper. The Veeser
decision itself resulted from a misinterpretation of the Patrons
decision.88 Also, the Miner decision, 9 which was heavily relied
upon by the Veeser court, had been substantially weakened, if not
overruled, by Hartford Fair Grounds Association." Moreover,
the Veeser decision is contrary to the weight and trend of Ameri-
8 7 1d. at 53, n. 2, 110 N.W. 757, n. 2.
88See note 84 supra.
89Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
9 0Stowe v. Hartford Fair Grounds Assn. 249 Mich. 107, 227 N.W. 702 (1929) (allowing
contract between parent and subsidiary).
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can authority. The usual rule is that ratification is a substitute for
fairness, and not an additional requirement.91
in addition, Veeser's requirement that there be approval by a
quorum of disinterested directors is inimical to the needs of the
parent-subsidiary relation. Such a requirement unnecessarily re-
stricts the doctrine of majority rule without providing any signifi-
cant increase in protection.
The decision in Buck is even more difficult to understand when
considered in the light of Thomas v. Satfield Co.92The Thomas
case was decided only five months prior to the Buck case, yet it
reformed a transaction between two corporations with common
directors and stockholders by reducing the price paid by the
subsidiary corporation to its fiduciary solely on the basis of a lack
of fairness. No mention of approval by disinterested directors
(there were two) was made by the unanimous court in reforming
the contract. It is difficult to understand the sudden change of
heart exhibited by the pro-Veeser forces in the Buck decision.
The Veeser decision requirement of ratification has been ignored
since 1961, 9 3 but it remains a threat to all parent-subsidiary rela-
tions.
Whether ratification is a permissive procedure to protect
fiduciaries or a requirement for a valid relation between a corpo-
ration and a fiduciary, some discussion of what constitutes ratifi-
cation is necessary. The author has discovered few specific Mich-
igan rules concerning stockholder ratification. At common law, a
single shareholder could stop a sale of substantially all of the
corporation's assets. 94 The statutory change in this rule will be
discussed shortly. While unanimous shareholder action can ratify
an unfair contract, the effect of ratification by less than all share-
holders is unclear. Where a non-fraudulent transaction is to be
ratified, a majority or statutory percentage of the shareholders
may have the power to ratify. 95
91See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 778(b).
92363 Mich. 11,108 N.W.2d 907 (1961).
9 3Fenestra v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.w.2d (1961).9 4Voight v. Remick, 260 Mich. 108, 244 N.W. 446 (1932).
9 5Crowe v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 239 Mich. 300, 214 NW. 126 (1927) (See dis-
cussion accompanying note 86 supra.)
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Director ratification consists of affirmative approval by a ma-
jority of an interested quorum of directors, 96 or approval by a
majority of the disinterested directors 97 whether or not they con-
stitute a quorum. 98 If ratification remains a requirement under
Michigan law, the author suggests that ratification by directors
consist of a majority of all disinterested directors whether or not
the total disinterested directors constitute a quorum. This rule
would permit ratification of relations between a parent and a
subsidiary or other controlling shareholder. In those situations in
which there are only interested directors, since ratification would
not be possible, it would not be a prerequisite to a valid par-
ent-subsidiary transaction.
2. Independent Agent Ratification
A doctrine noted in a few Michigan cases, which might be
termed "independent agent ratification," permits validation of a
contract between a parent and a subsidiary where the subsidiary
is represented in the negotiations by independent, outside
agents.99 This type of informal, or pre-contractual, ratification is
also effective when disinterested directors of the subsidiary are
the negotiators. 100 This form of ratification can prove to be a
useful manuever when a parent controls all of the directors of the
subsidiary, or when minority directors of the subsidiary are hos-
tile to the parent. 10 1 In the former case, ratification can be obtain-
ed by employing outside agents; in the latter case by employing
the minority directors as negotiators.
9 6Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, O.&P.A.R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N.W. 905 (1889); Veeser v.
Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936).97 Buck v. Northern Dairy, 364 Mich. 45, 47-48 110 N.w.2d, 761-62 (1961). Although the
disinterested directors constituted a quorum in Buck, supra, the court did not require
such a quorum in its statement of the law.9 Whichever decision one reads determines which of the two possible rules one will follow.
The alternative doctrines appear to be of equal age in Michigan. Ten Eyck v. Pontiac,
Q. & P.A.R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N.W. 905 (1889) (approved by disinterested
quorum). Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 110-111, 53 N.W. 218, 222
(1892); "All the authorities agree that it is essential that the majority of the quorum of
the board of directors shall be disinterested in respect to the matters voted upon."9 9Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936).
'
0
°Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54.
'
0 t Loomis, A Squeeze on Directors, FORTUNE, May 15, 1969, at 146.
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Outsiders negotiating a transaction between a parent and a
subsidiary would themselves become fiduciaries and thus become
subject to the same standards and liabilities as other fiduciaries.
No Michigan decision has dealt with this problem. It is clear,
however, that such persons should be held accountable as
fiduciaries insofar as they are acting as protectors of the interest
of the subsidiary which has no other way to defend itself in its
dealings with its normal fiduciaries. 10 2
3. Statutory Changes
The relevant statutory changes in Michigan common law are
found in two sections of the M.G.C.A. These changes are section
46 (loans to officers, directors, and shareholders) and section 57
(sale or lease of substantially all of the corporation's assets). No
attempt has been made to establish by statute any general rules as
to the effect and proper manner of ratification.
A sale or lease of substantially all of a corporation's assets can
only be completed under authority granted by a majority of the
shareholders.10 3 The articles of incorporation may increase the
percentage required for approval. Subject to any provisions in-
cident to the authority granted by the shareholders, the directors
have the right to set the terms of sale as long as the terms are
"expedient and for the best interest of the corpo-
ration." 104[Emphasis added.] Although the statute mentions only
protection of the corporation, the courts have determined that any
resulting sale must not be fraudulent as to minority share-
holders.10 5 A recently enacted statute provides that, unless other-
wise stipulated in a corporation's by-laws or articles, the board of
directors may authorize a pledge or mortgage of all or any part of
the firm's assets without stockholder approval.10 6
'
02Stockholder ratification could be an expensive procedure. It may also be impracticable
since Michigan requires a 100 percent ratification vote before a shareholder is
precluded from challenging the transaction.
103Michigan Wolverine Student Co-operative, Inc. v. Goodyear & Co., 314 Mich. 590, 22
N.W.2d 884 (1946).
1°4MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 450.57 (1967).
105Porter v. Porter Machine Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953).
1
°6MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.57a (1967).
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When a sale of all of a firm's assets to a corporate fiduciary is
proposed, the interested party will, no doubt, desire to vote his
shares. Section 57 is silent on this point, but under the common
law, he should be able to vote subject to a duty not to vote for a
proposal or a grant of authority where the financial interests of
other shareholders would be unfairly injured. Generally, a share-
holder may not object to a sale or lease under section 57 unless
there has been fraud,10 7 or an attempt to alter a vested right.108
Mere proof of unfairness is insufficient to prove a breach of
fiduciary duty unless the voting fiduciary's votes were required
for passage. A dissenter's sole remedy is normally redemption of
his stock for its fair cash value under section 44.109
Section 46 prohibits loans by non-financial corporations to
shareholders, directors and officers unless approved by the direc-
tors. Such approval must be by a ".... vote of at least 2/3
[two-thirds] of all the members of the board of directors of the
corporation excluding any director obtaining such loan..."," It
is not clear whether the clause "excluding any director obtaining
such loan" modifies "the vote of at least two-thirds," or "all of
the members," or both phrases. A cogent argument can be made
for each of the three possibilities. The statute should be read as
requiring approval by two-thirds of all disinterested directors.
Such an interpretation avoids any possibility of an interested
director voting upon the resolution, and it also allows loans where
more than one-third of the directors are interested in the matter.
A second problem concerning the interpretation of section 46
is the meaning of the phrase "excluding any director obtaining
such loan." [Emphasis added] A question arises whether a direc-
tor controlled by a parent corporation may vote upon a proposed
loan to the parent. Applying the rule that the controlled party is
merely a puppet of the controller, such a director should not be
allowed to vote to grant the loan."1 This result is proper since to
'
0 7 Porter v. Porter Machine Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953).
'
08 Weekler v. Valley City Milling Co., 93 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1950).
1'Porter v. Porter Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W.2d 135 (1953).
"10 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.46 (1967).
'Wagner Electric Co. v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934);
M.S.A. § 27A. 3605.
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allow otherwise would emasculate the statute by permitting the
fiduciary to approve loans to himself contrary to the apparent
intent of the statute. Therefore, loans by a subsidiary to a parent
corporation must be approved by a 2/3 vote of all directors not
controlled by the parent.1 12 If a loan is not made according to this
procedure, it is not ipso facto void, but merely voidable in favor
of the corporation.
VI. Remedies for Breach of Duty Owed by Parent or
Other Corporation Fiduciary.
A. Equity
Courts of equity have jurisdiction over any alleged violation of
duty to the corporation.113 However, equity courts will not as-
sume jurisdiction where there is merely dissatisfaction among the
shareholders since one requirement of jurisdiction is that there be
fraud or breach of duty.'1 4 When an accounting is necessary,
relief is more likely to be granted than when an injunction or
other non-monetary relief is required. An early Michigan decision
held that equity will act "when the evil is apparent" and will not
"await the consummation of the threatened wrong." 1 5 A recent
Michigan Supreme Court opinion, while not expressly rejecting
these earlier statements, required that plaintiff prove imminent
danger or an illegal act before an injunction will issue.' 16
Courts of equity have often fashioned custom-made remedies
112c.f. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36
(1966).
113 1d.; and In re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635, I N.W.2d 19 (1941). See also MicH.
CoMP. LAWS § 450.47 (1967).
14Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (1915). For an
example of legal remedy used to protect the corporation see note 113 supra; Holden
v. Lashley-Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W. 2d 590 (1947). Equitable relief is
also open to creditors and the corporation itself. Wiseman v. United Dairies, 324
Mich. 473, 37 N.W. 2d 174 (1949).
"15Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (1915) (The
"wrong" was domination for parent's benefit).
"l8 Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W. 2d 36
(1966) (also holding an impending take-over is not a "danger"). Wagner Electric
Corp. v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934) (will only grant
injunctions to prevent irreparable harm).
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when monetary damages were inadequate to protect a corporation
from its fiduciaries.' 17 A common method of relief is refusal to
enforce a contract made in violation of fiduciary duty. This type
of relief is easy to grant and supervise, but it is not always
sufficient or applicable. The courts are restrained in their in-
fringement of the traditional rights of shareholders, directors and
officers,' 18 but they are nonetheless willing to draft decrees equal
to the task of discouraging or preventing future improprieties.
B. Damages.
Monetary relief may include damages, interest, and costs.119
The measurement of damages is a very troublesome procedure.
Damages may not be speculative.' 20 It is unclear under Michigan
law whether damages may include profits made by a fiduciary in
breach of his duty when there has been no actual present loss or
loss of opportunity. A federal court interpreting Michigan law has
held that such profits must be turned over to the corporation since
they constituted unjust enrichment.121 It is proper to award dam-
117E.g., Barth v. Bredshall, 260 Mich. 522, 245 N.W. 788 (1932) (Corporation ordered to
cancel fiduciary's stock issued for inadequate consideration); Affeldt v. Dudley Paper
Co., 306 Mich. 39, 10 N.W. 2d 299 (1943) (Corporation ordered to pay accumulated
preferred dividends); Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128, 251 N.W. 421 (1933)
(damages, transfer of patent to corporation and removal of fiduciary); Baker v.
Hellner Realty, 265 Mich. 625, 251 N.W. 793 (1933) (set aside deed to fiduciary);
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice. Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892) (ordered dissolution
plus damages); Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961)
(reformed contract with fiduciary); Turner v. Calumet & Helca Mining Co., 187
Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718 (195 1)(prohibited parent from electing common directors);
Fenestra, Inc., v. Gulf Land Development Corps., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36
(1966) (equity can order devestiture, suspend voting rights, remove directors); Hold-
en v. Lashley Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W.2d 590 (1947) (dissolution plus
damages).
11 8 Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 596-604, 141 N.W.2d
36, 52-55 (1966).119 Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W. 2d 176 (1960); Patrons' Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929) (allowing reasonable
compensation for services performed under invalid contract).120cf. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Land Development Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36
(1966).12 1Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (1950). "It does not appear that Kaiser-Frazer was
damaged by the transaction nor was it deprived of any profit which it otherwise
should have had, but there was unjust enrichment to Frazer as a result of the board's
action". id. at 37. The author has not found a Michigan case on this point. Nor has a
case been discovered adopting the rule of Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 95 L. Ed.
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ages where a relation is unfair, and it may be argued that a
relation is unfair when the corporation does not receive the mar-
ket value for the benefit it gratuitously bestowed on its fiduciary.
When there is no actual present loss or loss of opportunity,
however, the measure of damages should be the fair market value
of the benefit, not the fiduciary's profit.
When the fiduciary steals a business opportunity of his corpo-
ration, he must surrender his profits.122 The rule has been referred
to in Michigan and elsewhere as the doctrine of "secret
profits." 123 The usual measure of damages in cases not involving
the theft of a corporate opportunity is the difference between the
fair market value of the benefit received by the corporation
through the relation, such as goods, office space, use of mailing
lists, and that given by the corporation. The proper situation in
which to use the alternative measurements of damages, "secret
profits," remains unclear. One court has attempted to clarify this
issue:
When directors sell their own property to a
corporation, through their own action or
influence as officers, or without disclosing
their interest, and the corporation does not
repudiate the purchase and rescind, the direc-
tors are liable not upon the theory of secret
profits (citation omitted); but for fraud or ex-
cessive price, and the measure of damages is
the difference between the price paid by the
corporation and the fair value of the property
(citation omitted).
... If they purchase personally, with the in-
tention to sell to the corporation, or while
purporting to act as corporation officers, the
whole benefit of the purchase inures to the
corporation and the rule of secret profits ap-
plies. In such case, the rule of damages is that
directors would be liable for the price paid by
927, 71 S. Ct. 680 (195 1), holding a trustee (in bankruptcy) liable for profits made by
his employees.12 2Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 326 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926); Young Spring &
Wire Co. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943). See also Blaustein v. Pan
Am. Petroleum & Transport, 293 N.Y. 286, 56 N.E. 2d 705 (1944); H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 79 (1946).
'2Bliss Petroleum Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 53 (1931).
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the corporation less the cost of the lease to
them. 124
The proper measure of damages, therefore, depends upon the
intent and the capacity in which the corporate fiduciary acts at the
time he acquires the property which is later sold to the corpo-
ration. Where the challenged act is a purchase from the corpo-
ration rather than a sale, the measure of damages is the fair value
of the property less the price paid.12 5
Prior to 1961, the question of fairness was thought to be
measured as of the date on which the relation began. 126 Then, in
Thomas v. Satfield Co.,127 the court measured fairness as of the
time of the corporation's performance. The corporate fiduciary
was to build a bowling alley for the corporation for a fixed price.
The court reformed the price in the contract to make the
fiduciary's profit percentage equal to the figure which parole evi-
dence indicated the corporation wanted the fiduciary to realize.
The fiduciary was thwarted in his efforts to minimize his costs of
performance in an attempt to make more on the fixed price
contract. His efforts not only failed to increase his earnings, but
they resulted in decreased dollar profits, though not in a de-
creased percentage. In effect, the court applied a modified "secret
profits" rule, restricting an allegedly agreed upon amount. Such
protection by reformation seems unnecessary. The question
should be whether the initial terms were fair at the time the
relation was entered into. Courts should not go beyond the origi-
nal expectations of the corporation.
The liability of directors who are disinterested, but who abstain
from voting or who are not in attendance during deliberations or
voting, has not been decided in Michigan.12 8 It is well established,
124 1d. at 573, 237 N.W. 55.
125Brown Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772 (1927); cf. Miner v. Belle Isle
Ice Co., 93 Mich. 53 N.W. 218 (1892). A modification of contract which is invalid
because of a breach of fiduciary duty has no effect on the original contract. Veeser v.
Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936).120Brown Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772 (1927). See also Pergament v.
Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 23 (E.D: Mich. 1950), "We also-hold that we should apply
the law and view the transaction in the light of the facts existing at that time; not what
happened later."
127363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961).
128See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378
(1918) (abstention does not satisfy duty to exercise positive judgment).
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however, that a director voting for an unfair proposal, as well as
the parent corporation, is liable even though his vote is controlled
by the parent.129 A director's right to contribution from those who
joined him in his breach of duty has not yet been decided in
Michigan.130
The allowance of interest on the damages is within the dis-
cretion of the courts. Interest computed from the time of the
decree13 2 or the time of the wrong has been granted.' 33 Costs
usually are awarded to the winning party.13 4 Attorneys' fees are
only awarded where a derivative suit is successful.
VII. Conclusion
Michigan law governing relations between subsidiaries, their
parents, and other interested fiduciaries is both confused and, in
some instances, unnecessarily restrictive. This indefiniteness calls
for a complete examination of the law in this area. The author has
suggested a number of changes which may result from such an
inquiry.
Eliminating the doctrine of corporate control is central to re-
forming the law governing parent-subsidiary relations. Emphasis
should be refocused on the duty owed by all corporate-fiduciaries,
whether they are officers, controllers of one director, or in unchal-
lenged control of the board.
More precise standards are required for determining the valid-
ity of parent-subsidiary relations. The present standard of fairness
does not provide definite criteria by which corporate officials can
predict the validity of a proposed relationship. The ratification
procedure is well- suited to provide a more objective standard. A
hesitant parent or other fiduciary should submit a particular rela-
'29Wiseman v. United Dairies, Inc., 334 Mich. 473, 37 N.W.2d 174 (1949).
1'3 Michigan common law states that the law will not aid wrongdoers in adjusting equities
among themselves. Upham v. Dickinson, 38 Mich. 338 (1878), Contra, ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43 and N.Y. Bus. CORP. ACT § 719 (McKinney 1963).
"'
3 Young Spring & Wire Co. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943).
132 Young Spring & Wire Co. v. Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329.1 33Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128. 251 N.W. 421 (1933).
'
3 4Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128, 251 N.W. 421.
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tion, regardless of its fairness, to the interested board members
or shareholders for approval. Interested parties, whether directors
or shareholders, should not be permitted to vote, although they
may be counted towards a quorum. Approval by a majority of
those allowed to vote would, in the absence of fraud, validate the
proposed relation.
To enjoy the advantages of ratification, the electorate must be
informed; thus, complete disclosure of the relation's terms must
be made. Although disclosure of all parent-subsidiary relations
and their terms would place a heavy administrative burden on
many parents and their subsidiaries, it is necessary for the corpo-
ration, its minority directors, and shareholders to receive this
information to prevent its fiduciaries from overreaching. A bal-
ance might be struck by providing for notice of parent-subsidiary
and other fiduciary relations and their major terms in the annual
report to the shareholders, or, if none is made, the annual report
to the Department of the Treasury. Thus, shareholders and direc-
tors would have an opportunity to decide if further inquiry was
necessary. At the same time, the amount of disclosure to com-
petitors could be minimized.
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